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Abstract: The issue of appropriate corporate governance framework has been a focal point of recent reforms 
in many countries. This study provides a comprehensiv  comparative analysis of corporate governance 
regulatory systems and their evolution over the last 15 years in 30 European countries and the US. It proposes 
a methodology to create detailed corporate governance i dices which capture the major features of capital 
market laws in the analysed countries. The indices ndicate how the law in each country addresses various 
potential agency conflicts between corporate constituencies: namely, between shareholder and managers, 
between majority and minority shareholders, and betwe n shareholders and bondholders. The analysis of 
regulatory provisions within the suggested framework enables us to understand better how corporate law 
works in a particular country and which strategies r gulators adopt to achieve their goals. The 15-year time 
series of constructed indices and large country-coverage (30 European countries and the US) also allows us to 
draw conclusions about the convergence of corporate gov rnance regimes across the countries. To our best 
knowledge, this is the first study that intends to address the convergence debate empirically. The analysis is 
based on a unique corporate governance database that comprises the main changes in corporate governance 
regulations in the US and all European countries betwe n 1990-2005. 
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Triggered by the seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 
1998; hereafter LLSV), the economic effects of corporate governance regulation have received 
notable academic attention in recent years. The new stream of literature on law and finance does a 
comparative analysis of institutional frameworks around the world and studies their impact on 
economic behaviour and on the governance of firms. Although the importance of regulation on 
economic activities has been stressed since the late 1930s (see e.g. Coase, 1937; Pigou, 1938), LLSV 
have moved this topic to the top of the research agenda by documenting empirically the relationship 
between the law and economic growth, the development of markets, and the governance of firms. 
Importantly, LLSV develop the tools that enable researchers to compare institutional environments 
across countries and to study empirically the effects of corporate regulation. These tools comprise, 
amongst others, a country classification by legal origin and indices that characterize the quality of 
regulatory provisions covering the protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, as well as law 
enforcement.  
Nowadays, virtually every cross-country study employs the LLSV legal origin classification 
and corporate governance indices. However, the LLSV indices have some limitations. First, the 
indices are static and refer to national legal environments in 1995. In the late 1990s, many countries 
have undergone substantial reforms of their corporate legislations. It is therefore likely that the 
LLSV indices of 1995 no longer reflect the true differences in national legal systems since 1996 and 
hence require an update. There is little evidence regarding the scope of these reforms and their 
impact on the protection of the rights of corporate investors and the corporate governance system 
overall.  
A second limitation of the LLSV corporate governance indices is that the authors use a 
comparative approach to construct them. LLSV opt for the US corporate law as the reference legal 
system and identify the key legal provisions in the governance of US companies. Subsequently, they 
verify whether the same types of provisions are present in the law of other countries. It is therefore 
not surprising that countries with legal systems most closely resembling that of the US receive the 
highest score on the LLSV rating. This approach, however, typically ignores the regulatory 
principles that prevail in other countries but not in the US. Moreover, the system of corporate 
governance in the US is characterized as a sharehold r-based system in which the main objective of 
corporate law is to protect (atomistic) corporate investors from being expropriated by the firm’s 
management. In contrast, the systems prevailing in most European and Asian countries are 
characterized as stakeholder-based systems (such as the blockholder-oriented, labour-oriented, or 
state-oriented systems). In these countries, the expropriation of investors by the management is 
typically prevented via monitoring by the firm’s large shareholders, creditors or employees such that 
there is less need to address the problem at the regulatory level. It is therefore also not surprising that 
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most of the countries with a stakeholder-based system only have a low score on the LLSV 
shareholder rights protection rating. What is however ital in these countries is how well the law 
protects the interest of corporate investors from being expropriated by the controlling stakeholders 
(i.e. larger shareholders, employees, the state). This question goes beyond the scope of the LLSV 
index. 
In this paper we address the limitations of the LLSV corporate governance indices. First, we 
develop three new corporate governance indices that reflect the quality of national laws aimed at 
protecting (i) corporate shareholders from being expropriated by the firm’s management, (ii) 
minority shareholders from being expropriated by the large blockholder, and (iii) creditors from 
being expropriated by the firm’s shareholders. When co structing the indices, we depart from the 
comparative approach employed by LLSV and use a functio al approach instead. That is, we 
identify all major provisions of corporate laws by country and classify them according to the degree 
of protection they offer to the above-mentioned principals. Subsequently, we quantify the regulatory 
provisions using three indices that characterize the effectiveness of the legal system in reducing the 
three basic agency problems: those arising between the management and the shareholders, between 
majority and minority shareholders, and between creditors and shareholders. The advantage of the 
functional approach is that it covers all regulatory p ovisions currently in existence in all European 
countries and the US and allows us to construct indices that capture both the weak and strong aspects 
of the various corporate governance regimes. 
Second, we empirically document the evolution of corporate governance regulations for all 
(30) European countries and the US. We analyse whether regulatory convergence has been started, 
and, if so, detect the main patterns of the converge p ocess. Using the three indices we examine how 
corporate governance regulation has changed in countries over the past 15 years. The study of the 
evolution of corporate governance regulations is appe ling because it contributes to the ongoing 
debate on whether a single system of corporate governance is likely to develop (see e.g. McCahery 
et al. 2002). To our best knowledge, this is the first study that intends to address this question 
empirically.  
The analysis in this paper is based on a unique corporate governance database that comprises 
the main changes in corporate governance regulations in the US and all European countries between 
1990-2005. The database is based on studying various c rporate legislations, a questionnaire sent to 
leading corporate governance specialists as well as direct interview with these specialists. The 
questionnaire is on the various aspects of the corporate governance regimes and their evolution since 
the early 1990s. The questionnaire contains 55 questions that cover the most important provisions of 
company law, stock exchange rules, and bankruptcy and reorganization law at both the national and 
supranational level. In particular, the questions cover the following: (i) shareholder and creditor 
protection regulation, (ii) accounting standards, (iii) disclosure rules, (iv) takeover regulation 
(mandatory bid, squeeze-out rule, takeover defence measures, etc.), (v) insider trading regulation, 
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(vi) regulation regarding the structure of the board of directors and voting power distribution, (vii) 
and adoption of codes of good practice. In total, about 150 legal experts throughout Europe and the 
US have contributed to our database on the changes in corporate governance regulation (see 
Appendix I).  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of corporate 
regulation. Section 3 describes our unique database on corporate law reforms in 30 European 
countries and the US. Section 4 discloses the compositions of the corporate governance indices. 
Section 5 documents the dynamics of corporate governance regulation reforms and predicts the 
consequences of these reforms for the (lack of) evolution towards a single corporate governance 
system. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The role of corporate governance regulation 
 
2.1. Agency problems between corporate constituents  
 
A typical public corporation represents a legal entity with limited liability, transferable 
shares, delegated management under a board structure, and investor ownership (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2004). Together, these characteristics make a corporation the most attractive form of 
business organization. However, they also generate the potential for agency problems. 
The conflicts of interests between management and shareholders frequently arise in 
companies with a dispersed ownership structure. In these firms, small shareholders cannot 
effectively manage the firm due to coordination problems and hence have to delegate the control 
over the firm to professional managers. However, the separation of ownership and control leads to a 
divergence of interests between the managers and shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932). The 
managers may forgo the shareholders’ wealth maximization objective and undertake actions which 
maximize their personal interests but not the value of the company. Research on corporate 
governance shows that shareholders may prevent the misuse of corporate assets by managers either 
by aligning the managerial interests with their own through executive compensation contracts or by 
effectively monitoring managerial actions (see e.g.Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Becht et al., 2005.). Since the coordination problem among small shareholders does not allow 
them to effectively monitor the management, they have to rely on external monitoring via the market 
for corporate control (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1988).1  
  The conflict of interests between management and shareholder is less severe in companies 
with concentrated ownership structure. In these firms, the controlling shareholders have strong 
incentives to monitor management and replace it in poorly performing companies (Franks, Mayer 
                                                
1 Hostile takeovers can target poorly performing firms and replace poorly performing management. The threa  of losing 
their jobs and perquisites provides managers with an incentive to focus on shareholder objectives.  
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and Renneboog, 2001). However, the presence of a controlling shareholder may induce another 
agency problem: the potential opportunistic behaviour f the large blockholder towards minority 
shareholders (see e.g. Faccio and Stolin, 2004). The activities aimed at expropriating minority 
shareholders are reduced when the management is held accountable to the interests of all shareholder 
including minority shareholders. Companies may formulate such accountability in the bylaws of the 
company e.g. by ensuring the delegation and concentration of control to a board of directors which is 
independent from the controlling shareholder; by aligning managerial interests with those of 
(minority) shareholders through managerial compensation contracts; and by clearly defining the 
fiduciary duties of managers and directors. 
The legal entity of public corporations and limited liability of their shareholders may 
engender another potential conflict of interest, namely that between creditors and shareholders.2 The 
equity of a leveraged firm can be viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets whose value increases 
with the volatility of future cash flows (Black and Scholes, 1973). This means that the management 
can maximize shareholder wealth by increasing the risk of the projects it invests in, and hence re-
distribute wealth from creditors to its shareholders. This conflict of interests between creditors and
shareholders is likely to be resolved when the creditors are able to perform effectively monitor the 
corporate activities. 
 
2.2 Why do we need corporate governance regulation? 
 
It is in the interests of companies and their management to implement mechanisms that 
mitigate the agency problems mentioned above. Companies that can credibly commit themselves to 
act in the best interests of their constituents benefit from lower costs of equity and debt capital, 
labor, and other inputs and from a higher value of their products or services to clients (Becht, Bolton 
and Roell, 2005). The mechanisms available to companies to resolve the agency problems include 
managerial compensation contracts, (hostile) takeovers, concentrated ownership structures, 
delegation to and concentration of control by the board of directors which acts independently from 
executive directors and controlling shareholders, and clearly defined in corporate bylaws fiduciary 
duties. However, if companies were able to provide a quate protection to their investors, regulatory 
intervention is unnecessary. This raises a question as to why we need corporate governance 
regulation aimed at protecting the rights of corporate (minority) shareholders and creditors? 
The theoretical literature gives a number of reasons. First, regulatory intervention helps 
markets to achieve the maximization of social welfar  rather than the welfare of individual investors 
(see e.g. Pigou, 1938). To illustrate this in the context of corporate governance regulation, consider 
                                                
2 The legal status of the company entails that creditors are first in line in the absolute priority ranking and hence have the 
first claim on the corporation’s assets while the sareholders are residual claimants. Limited liability implies that the 




an example of the disclosure requirements related to corporate activities. In the absence of the 
disclosure requirements, managers may be tempted to conceal some details of the projects in which 
their company is involved for perfectly legitimate reasons, e.g. to keep their competitors uninformed 
and gain a competitive advantage in the future. However, more detailed information about corporate 
projects allow investors to assess the corporate growth potential better and to invest their money into 
companies that can generate the highest returns. Therefore, if all companies were to conceal 
information about their activities, a more inefficient allocation of capital would arise, leading to 
lower economic growth. Hence, a re-distribution of wealth between competing companies caused by 
a higher level of disclosure seems less harmful for the economy than the misallocation of capital 
caused by the lack of transparency. As such, mandatory rules that impose more disclosure enable 
economies to achieve a more optimal outcome. 
The second reason for adopting a specific corporate gov rnance regulation is that it forces 
companies to commit credibly to a higher quality of governance (Becht et al., 2005). Even if 
companies initially design efficient governance rules, they may break or alter them at a later stage. 
Investors anticipate this and are willing to provide firms with funds at lower costs only when 
companies find ways to commit credibly to good governance. However, credible pre-commitment 
mechanisms may be expensive or unavailable in countries lacking an effective institutional 
framework (Doidge et. al., 2004). For instance, a well-functioning infrastructure (in terms of internal 
control structures, audit mechanisms, voting procedur s at the annual meetings etc.) is required to 
enable investors to verify the information that companies disclose (see e.g. Black, 2001).3  
The importance of corporate governance regulation for corporate activities and economic 
growth has been further emphasized in a growing number of empirical studies. These papers show 
that a corporate governance regime has a significant mpact on the availability and cost of capital, 
corporate performance, and the distribution of corporate value between the firm’s stakeholders: 
shareholders, creditors, employees, consumers, and suppliers. Weak legal environment combined 
with weak enforcement of the law distorts an efficient allocation of resources, undermines the ability 
of companies to compete internationally, and hinders investment and economic development (see 
e.g. Levine, 1998, 1999; La Porta et al., 2002; Djankov et al., 2004).  
 
2.3 Evolution of legal systems and corporate governance regimes 
 
Given the beneficial impact of corporate governance regulation (as documented above) on 
economic growth, the development of markets, and the governance of firms, a natural question to 
                                                
3 For example, investors are able to sue a company if it had concealed particular information that is required to be 
reported by law. It would be a difficult task for investors to prove corporate negligence in the absence of mandatory 
disclosure requirements.  
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ask is whether or not a particular national legal system has a competitive advantage over other legal 
systems, and if so whether the alternative regimes ought to converge towards it. 
In this extensive body of research, there is yet no consensus as to the best system of corporate 
law (for an overview of this literature see Goergen et al., 2005). Some law and economics academics 
proclaim the superiority of the UK and US legal system, characterized by a focus on shareholder 
value and good shareholder protection. There are also supporters of the alternative legal systems 
characterized by a focus on the welfare of employees, creditors, and other types of stakeholders and 
weak shareholder protection. They claim that the long-term interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders are not necessarily at odds, such that the different types of governance regimes may 
produce similar outcomes in terms of long-term economic growth (Bratton and McCahery, 2000). 
However, the lack of consensus regarding the optimal system of corporate regulation has 
implications for the current law reforms. It raises the question as to the direction reformers of 
national systems should adopt. 
Bebchuk and Roe (2000) argue that the direction of legal reforms is typically pre-determined 
by initial institutional structures in a country. In particular, ownership and control concentration is an 
important factor that affects the role and function of corporate legislation and hence the direction of 
its reforms. This is because the degree of ownership and control concentration plays a key role in the 
relationships between the different corporate stakeholders. In countries where widely-held 
companies prevail, the main function of corporate governance regulation is to protect shareholders 
from being expropriated by the management. In countries where a vast majority of companies have a 
concentrated ownership and control structure, the function of corporate governance regulation is to 
minimize the extent of agency problems between majority and minority shareholders and that 
between shareholders and creditors.  
The differences in the role and functions of corporate governance regulation across countries 
with dispersed and concentrated ownership structures imply that the convergence of corporate 
governance regulations towards a single legal system may not be an issue. However, legal 
convergence is not a necessary (nor sufficient) conditi  for achieving more harmonisation of 
corporate governance systems. The reason is that a corporate governance system is a broader 
concept than corporate governance regulation and covers a broader set of institutional settings 
typically characterized by the quality of legal protection of corporate constituencies, concentration of 
ownership and control, and the development of capital markets.  
Bebchuk (1999) shows that, in the presence of large private benefits of control, better 
protection of shareholders is unlikely to affect the degree of ownership concentration. Even if better 
protection from the expropriation by the management were introduced, an incumbent blockholder is 
unlikely to sell his stake because a third party acquiring a controlling block is unable to compensate 
him for his private benefits of control. Thus, where private benefits of control are high, regulatory 
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reforms aimed at improving investor protection are lik ly to reinforce the existing ownership and 
control structures.  
Roe (2002) proposes an alternative scenario. In his view, if the costs of monitoring 
management are high relative to the private benefits of control a blockholder enjoys, better legal 
protection from expropriation by the management may le d to a shift from concentrated to dispersed 
ownership. This shift may be further enhanced by some other drawbacks of concentrated control, 
such as the costs of low liquidity and undiversified risk. We conclude that corporate law reforms that
improve investor protection are likely to lead towards more dispersed ownership provided that 
private benefits of control are relatively low.  
 
Table 1. Reforms of corporate governance regulation and their expected impact on ownership and 
control within a particular corporate governance system 
 
Initial characteristics of the system  Corporate governance regulation reforms Expected effect on the 
ownership structure 
   
 Low minority shareholders 
protection  
(High private benefits of control) 
Improve in investor protection  Remains concentrated 
 High minority shareholders 
protection  
(Low private benefits of control) 
Improve in investor protection  More dispersed  
   
   
 Low investor protection  
(High managerial discretion) 
Decrease in private benefits of control  Remains concentrated  
 High investor protection 
(Low managerial discretion) 
Decrease in private benefits of control  More disper ed  
   
 
It also follows from Bebchuk (1999) and Roe (2002) that, when investor protection is already 
high, reforms aiming at reducing private benefits of c ntrol may bring about ownership dispersion. 
However, if the management has substantial discretion o apply anti-takeover measures, the 
preferred ownership distribution may shift towards a more concentrated structure even if private 
benefits of control are curbed. Table 1 summarizes th  above conjectures. 
In sum, this section has shown that the adoption of a unified corporate governance regulation 
by countries with different initial institutional structures (in terms of voting structure, ownership and 
control, capital market development etc.) may not necessarily lead to the convergence of their legal 
corporate governance regimes. However, the adoption of country-specific corporate legislations may 
induce the convergence of wider corporate governance systems.  
 




In this paper, we explore a unique corporate governance database that comprises the main 
changes in corporate governance regulation in the US and all European countries (including 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe) over the last 15 years. The database is based on the 
study of various corporate governance regulations,  the results from a detailed questionnaire sent 
to more than 150 legal experts, and on direct interviews with some of these experts. 
Our approach can be summarized as follows: based on corporate legislation, corporate 
governance codes and the scientific literature, we have drafted a detailed set of questions about the 
main aspects of corporate governance regulation that applies to listed companies. A final set of 50 
questions was put to leading corporate governance exp rts (mostly academic lawyers but also some 
practitioners from law firms). As we focus on listed companies, we have asked the contributors to 
this project to consider soft law, comprising: (i) (hard) corporate law; (ii) stock exchange regulations 
(listing requirements); (iii) codes of good practice provided there is a legal basis for these codes (th  
law refers to a code of good practice which is itself not incorporated in the law); and (iv) corporate 
practice.4 The names and affiliations of the corporate governance experts who have contributed to 
the mapping of the corporate governance regulation of their own countries are presented in Data 
Appendix.   
Somewhat to our surprise, our straightforward question  on the presence or application of 
specific corporate governance regimes frequently receiv d conflicting answers. Consequently, we 
have re-contacted the involved experts to ask additional questions and have sought the advice of 
additional experts in order to reach clear answers. Still, from this experience, we must conclude that 
the current corporate governance regulations (corporate law, legally binding codes, and stock 
exchange regulations) leave room for interpretation and sometimes cause confusion even among 
legal experts.  
 
4. Corporate Governance indices 
 
As discussed in section 2, corporate law plays an important role in mitigating the three 
central conflicts of interest between the main corporate constituencies: the agency problems which 
arise between the management and the shareholders, between majority and minority shareholders, 
and between creditors and shareholders. In this section, we provide a concise overview of the 
existing corporate governance regulations in Europe and the US. We classify the main provisions of 
the existing regulations according to their efficiency in mitigating the conflicts of interests within a 
corporation. Based on this classification, we quantify the regulatory provisions for each country and 
                                                
4 In some cases, corporate practice deviates from corporate law. For instance, the regulator in the UK allows that firms 
issue shares with and without voting rights. Still, since the early 1990s virtually all listed firms on the London Stock 
Exchange have shares outstanding with voting rights as the issuance of non-voting shares was frowned upon by the 
stock exchange. Hence, in practice, the UK-system hinges on the ‘one-share-one-vote’ principle. We accept this 
principle as a corner stone concept of the UK corporate governance regime. 
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combine them into three indices that characterize how well national legislations minimize the extent 
of the agency issues.  
The economic literature suggests two main approaches to resolve principal-agent problems: 
(i) create incentives such that agents act in the int rest of their principals; and (ii) enhance the 
disciplining power of principals (see e.g. Becht, 2005). To implement these approaches, the law can 
deploy a number of governance strategies. Hansmann and Kraakman (2004) suggest the following 
classification of such strategies: (i) strengthening the appointment rights of principals, (ii) 
reinforcing the decision rights of principals, (iii) augmenting the trusteeship, (iv) enhancing 
corporate transparency, and (v) adopting an affiliation strategy.5 The appointment rights strategy 
regulates shareholders’ power to select or remove directors. The decision rights strategy grants 
shareholders with the power to intervene and initiate or ratify managerial decisions. The trusteeship 
strategy allows shareholders to appoint an independent body (a trustee) that will represent their 
interests in the firm and monitor managers. The transp rency strategy seeks to eliminate conflicts of 
interests by enforcing strict disclosure requirements on corporate policies and contracts directly 
related to managers. Finally, an affiliation strategy sets the terms on which shareholders affiliate 
with managers. These typically involve shareholder rights to entry and exit on fair terms. The 
strategies are not limited to reducing the agency problem between shareholders and managers, but 
can also be deployed to address any other agency problems (e.g. between minority and majority 
shareholders or between shareholders and creditors).  
The analysis of regulatory provisions within the framework of the above governance 
strategies enables us to understand better how corporate law works in a particular country and which 
strategies regulators adopt to achieve their goals. Hence, we classify the regulatory provisions (i) by 
type of agency problems and, (ii)  by  governance strategies within each type of agency problem. We 
model our corporate governance indices as a sum of sub-indices that indicate the scope of legal 
protection through different strategies.  
 
4.1 Regulatory provisions addressing management-shareholder relations 
 
When shareholders have limited power, agency problems may be substantial: management 
may then pursue their own interests (among others; corporate growth at the expense of value 
creation, excessive remuneration, value-reducing mergers and acquisitions (M&As) or a so-called 
‘empire building’ strategy). These managerial objectives may be detrimental to shareholders’ 
interests (which is corporate value or getting a fair return on their investment). To assess the relativ  
shareholder power granted by law, we study the regulatory provisions that aim at mitigating 
                                                
5 There are a number of other strategies open to the law, such as a reward strategy that seeks to altermanagerial 
incentives to act in the interests of shareholders. However, these strategies are usually applied by companies directly 
rather than imposed by the law. We therefore do not consider  them in our legal indices. 
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managerial opportunistic behavior. Such provisions grant shareholders the right to appoint and 
dismiss the board of directors and to control most of the important corporate decisions (for instance, 
on equity issues or takeovers). We also consider the egulation that requires corporate transparency, 
and demands that the board of directors acts on behalf of the shareholders and effectively monitors 
top management. 
 
4.1.1 The appointment rights strategy 
Appointment and replacement rights enable shareholdrs to shape the basic structure, power, 
and the composition of a firm’s internal governance structure. Voting rules and requirements on the 
board’s composition are the main components of these shareholder rights.  
Among the voting rules, we distinguish between the requirements for the nomination to the 
board by shareholders, the voting procedures (whether or not proxy voting by mail is allowed, 
whether or not shareholders are required to register and deposit shares prior to the general meeting), 
and restrictions imposed on the length of directors’ contracts. With their right to elect the directors, 
shareholders can affect the composition of the board. This power should ensure the board’s 
representativeness of shareholder interests. Some jurisdictions like the Netherlands restrict 
shareholders’ election power in order to ensure the representation of labor interests in the 
boardroom. However, labor representation may erode shareholder power. A similar problem arises 
when a jurisdiction mandates employee representatio on the board (as is the case in Germany, 
Luxembourg, and Norway). The presence of employee representatives (co-called codetermination) 
on the board reduces the power of directors elected by shareholders which may make it more 
difficult for them to implement corporate strategies n the best interest of shareholders.  
Whereas codetermination redistributes the power from shareholders to employees, cross-
shareholdings between two firms increase the relativ  power of management. Company’s shares 
held by its subsidiary (or a firm in which the company has a controlling stake) are typically more 
under the discretion of the company’s management. The management may use these shares to affect 
corporate decisions that are to be approved by the shareholder assembly (board members’ election, 
in particular) to its own benefit. This makes the agency problems between management and 
shareholders more severe. Regulatory restrictions on cr ss-shareholdings are seen as an instrument 
mitigating these potential distortions. We expect shareholder interests to be better protected in 
countries where cross-shareholdings are addressed at a regulatory level and limits are imposed on 
share stakes held by a subsidiary in its parent firm.  
When shareholders cannot vote by mail and are required to register and/or deposit shares 
prior to the meeting, their participation in management elections may be substandard and may 
augment inside managers’ power to appoint their owncandidates. The requirement to register6 and 
                                                
6 In many Continental European countries, bearer share  re issued. Therefore, companies may require the shareholders 
to register prior to a general annual meeting such that they will be able to participate to the meeting.  
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block7 shares several days prior to the general meeting is seen as a barrier for many shareholders to 
participate in the meeting, and decreases shareholdrs’ participation in corporate decision-making. 
Therefore, we consider the election rules that enabl  shareholders to send their votes by mail and 
prohibit companies to require share deposits prior to the meeting as instruments that ensure better 
representation of the shareholder interests in the boardroom.  
Restrictions on the length of managerial contracts encourage shareholders to assess 
managerial performance on a regular basis and replac  board members when they do not satisfy 
shareholder requirements. Long-term contracts with board members are seen as a barrier to replace 
inefficient directors. The shorter the contractual tenure, the more incentives directors have to act in 
the interests of shareholders in order to be re-elect d for another term8. In countries where the 
mandatory frequency of managerial rotation is high, the management-shareholders conflict of 
interests is likely to be less pronounced.  
We consider the regulatory provisions mentioned above t  be important legal mechanisms 
that grant shareholders appointment and replacements rights. We therefore quantify these provisions 
into an index capturing the efficiency of appointment and replacement rules that align the interests of 
management and shareholders. The components of the index and their coding are given in Table 2. A 
higher index score indicates higher likelihood that m nagement acts in the interest of shareholders. 
 
4.1.2 The decision rights strategy 
The right to participate in corporate decisions enables shareholders to effectively monitor the 
management and prevent the misuse of corporate assets. However, due to coordination problems, 
(atomistic) shareholders are unable to participate in daily decision-making but can only be expected 
to weigh on major corporate decisions (e.g. the use of takeover defence measures, new equity issues, 
and mergers and acquisitions). Shareholders have the power to affect these activities if corporate 
legislation grants them with preemption rights, rights to approve the adoption of anti-takeover 
measures, and rights to call for an extraordinary general meeting.  
Hostile takeovers constitute a real threat for corporate managers of losing their jobs. 
Therefore, managers may be tempted to unduly implement takeover-defence measures that 
discourage potential buyers from taking over the company, even if this violates the shareholders’ 
interests. The shareholders’ right to approve anti-takeover measures is a mechanism to mitigate 
managerial discretion over the firm’s cash flows. Preemption rights can also be considered as an 
                                                
7 Companies may require shareholders to deposit their s ares several days prior to a general annual meeting such that 
investors that acquire shares during the deposit period are unable to participate in the meeting. This way, firms can 
prevent strategic trades in shares (votes) in the period around the meeting. .  
8 However, short-term contracts have a negative impact on managerial incentives to focus on long-term investment 
projects. Managers that anticipate to be fired in the end of their term are more likely to focus on short-term projects 
and short-term profits. Therefore, very short contracts may be undesirable.  
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anti-takeover mechanism; therefore shareholders vote on their approval is required to lessen 
managerial discretion. 
Shareholders disagreeing with certain managerial should have a right to call an extraordinary 
general meeting. The lower the minimum percentage needed to call such a meeting is, the easier 
shareholders can intervene in critical situations ad present their concerns of any mismanagement of 
the company.  
A major shareholder in a firm typically has a decisive power and strong incentives to monitor 
management and replace it in poorly performing companies (Franks at al., 2001). Bolton and von 
Thadden (1998) argue that the advantage of monitorig by blockholders is that it takes place on an 
ongoing basis. In contrast, the disciplining by atomistic shareholders only occurs in crisis situations. 
If the interests of the major shareholder coincide with those of minority shareholders, managerial-
shareholder conflict of interests is likely to be mitigated via monitoring by blockholders. However, 
an introduction of voting caps may reduce major share olders’ power to affect corporate decisions 
and may hence weaken the monitoring of management. Therefore, a regulation prohibiting voting 
caps can be considered as an additional mechanism to reduce managerial opportunism.  
 Using the regulatory provisions discussed above, we construct a decision rights index that 
captures the legal power of shareholders to participate in corporate decision-making. The 
constitutuants of the index and their coding are given in table 2; a higher index score indicates that 
managers have less discretion. 
 
4.1.3 The trusteeship strategy 
 Appointment and replacement rights ensure the shareholder’s representation on the board. 
However, having a shareholder representative on the board may not guarantee board’s accountability 
to the shareholders interests, unless there is a set of rules that guarantees the elected directors do 
monitor corporate managers in the interests of shareholders. The board’s independence from the 
management is essential. In practice, two board models are used: one-tier and two-tier board 
structures. Under the two-tier board, the governance functions are granted to a supervisory board (a 
board consisting of non-executive directors) who monitors top management assembled in the 
management board. In a unitary board system, both top management and non-executive directors 
make up the board. In order to guarantee board independence, the overlap between the management 
and supervisory boards in 2-tier systems is restricted. In a one-tier system, the CEO is usually 
forbidden to hold a position of chairman simultaneously. Separating the executives’ and non-
executives’ roles on the board enhances the monitoring f management.  
Some countries also require companies to establish a eparate board of auditors (for e.g. 
Italy). The main purpose of the board of auditors, which consists of people who do not serve as non-
executive directors, is to ensure that the management provides sufficient and truthful information 
about all corporate activities to regulatory authorities and shareholders. As such, it facilitates 
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monitoring by the market and thereby contributes to the improvement in the management-
shareholder relationship. In contrast, employee representation on the board is likely to have negative 
effect on the management-shareholder relation. Labor interests are often in conflict with those of 
company’s shareholders. The lack of consensus on corporate strategy, caused by a conflict of interest 
between directors representing employees and shareholders, enlarges the discretion of the 
management to implement corporate policies to their own benefit. Therefore, employee 
representation on the board is considered to be harmful for the shareholders. 
 
4.1.4 Transparency 
Transparency regulation intends to improve the quality of information about company and 
management. It should be noted that the intention of this legal strategy is not to improve the quality 
of the accounting procedures as these are usually not incorporated in corporate law but are set by 
accounting standards boards. More disclosure increases the informativeness of the market on e.g. 
corporate policies and contracts directly related to the management.   More specifically, corporate 
legislation regulates the extent to which information is released on the managerial compensation 
package (on an aggregate or individual basis, if at all) and the requirement to disclose any 
transactions between management and company (e.g. consulting contracts, interest-free loans). The 
quality of the transparency is more reliable when the law or the stock exchange regulations include a 
comply-or-explain principle. It is important that the codes of best practice which exist in almost 
every country are legally enshrined. 
Therefore, we collect information on the following transparency provisions : (i) requirement 
to disclose managerial compensation on aggregate or individual basis; (ii) requirement to disclose 
any transactions between management and company; (iii) frequency of financial reporting (annually, 
semi-annually, quarterly); and (iv) the presence of c mply or explain rules. We quantify these 
provisions into the transparency index. The composition of the index is presented in table 2; a higher 
index score reflects more transparency about corporate and managerial activities and profits. 
 
4.2 Regulatory provisions addressing majority-minority shareholders relationship 
 
We also study the relative power of the minority shareholders, which is particularly 
important when strong majority shareholders are present. This aspect of corporate governance is 
particularly important in Continental Europe where most of the listed firms are closely-held with one 
shareholder (group) often controlling a majority of the voting rights. In a firm with concentrated 
ownership, it is possible that the dominant shareholder influences managerial decisions to his own 
benefit and at the expense of minority shareholders. The minority shareholder legal protection rests 
on the regulatory provisions that increase the relative power of the minority shareholders and reduce 
the private benefits of control that the controlling blockholder can exploit at the detriment of these 
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shareholders. In this respect, vital rules are the direct minority shareholder rights (board 
representation, minority claims, extraordinary general meetings, blocking minorities), the one-share-
one-vote principle (dual class shares, voting caps, break-through rule, equal treatment principle), 
ownership transparency, and the relative power in case of a takeover threat.  
 
4.2.1 Appointment rights strategy 
The appointment rights strategy aims at protecting minority shareholders as it gives minority 
shareholders a say in the appointment of the management and the internal governance system (the 
body of non-executive directors). The most straightforward legal approach is to grant minority 
shareholders with a right to nominate their representative to the board. This director is independent 
from the large blockholders and monitors the management in order to prevent it from acting to the 
benefit of the large shareholders only.  
Additional legal solutions to increase the power of minority shareholders when a strong 
blockholder is present include the use of voting caps nd adherence to the one-share-one-vote 
principle. Voting caps curb the voting power of thelarge shareholder and hence reduce its influence 
on managerial actions, leaving more scope for minority shareholders to participate in corporate 
governance. The one-share-one vote principle aligns the blockholder’s cash flow and voting rights. 
Issuing dual class shares or non-voting shares allows some shareholders to accumulate control while 
limiting their cash investment. A ban on a deviation from the one-share-one-vote principle should 
discourage controlling blockholdings, as this makes them relatively more expensive than when the 
deviation from the principle is allowed. Less power concentration in the hands of large blockholders 
improves the status of minority shareholders in the firm and their role in the firm’s corporate 
governance.  
Overall, we expect the following regulatory provisions of an appointment rights strategy to 
contribute to minority shareholder protection: (i) mandatory minority shareholder representation on 
the board; (ii) rules that allow to apply voting caps; and (iii) a ban on the dual class shares (non-
voting and multiple-votes shares). We quantified the use of these regulations in our minority 
shareholders appointment rights index. The components of the index and their coding are disclosed 
in table 2; a higher index score reflects that the law upholds the rights of the minority shareholders. 
 
4.2.2 The decision rights strategy 
The most powerful regulatory strategy to enable minority shareholders to participate in the 
governance of their firm is to grant them strong decision rights. This is achieved either by 
introducing the need of a supermajority approval for major corporate decisions such that minorities 
who own a combined blocking minority are able to blck corporate policies that may harm their 
interests. Therefore, the higher is the majority percentage the law requires for a corporate decision to 
be approved by shareholders, the more powerful are the minority shareholders. Regulations that 
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grant shareholders the right to call for extraordinary meeting may also strengthen minority 
shareholders’ incentives to monitor management. The lev l of protection depends on the minimum 
percentage of share capital ownership required to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. 
The lower the percentage, the easier the minority shareholders can pass their concerns to the 
company’s management.  
We quantify the two types of legal provisions discussed above into the minority shareholders 
decision rights index, while the details on the coding are given in table 2. A higher index score 
reflects more power for minority shareholders to affect corporate decisions. 
 
4.2.3 The trusteeship strategy: Independence of directors fr m controlling shareholders 
The right to elect the directors to the board gives large shareholders the opportunity to affect 
the board composition as well as the board’s decisions. This may harm the interests of minority 
shareholders. Some jurisdictions, like the Netherlands, restrict the election power of the shareholders 
such that large shareholders’ influence on the board’s decision-making process is limited. 
Consequently, potential opportunistic behavior by the large blockholder is strongly reduced which 
thereby increases the protection of small shareholdrs.   
We quantify the provisions open to the trusteeship strategy into the minority shareholders 
trusteeship rights index. A higher index score reflects that the board of directors acts independently 
from the controlling shareholder and hence is more accountable for the interests of minority 
shareholders. The components of the index and their cod ng are given in table 2.  
 
4.2.4 The affiliation rights strategy 
Our final, but probably most powerful strategy of crporate law to enhance the power of 
minority shareholders is to provide them with entry and exit rights on fair terms. Most of the 
regulatory provisions of this category are part of the takeover regulation. The relevant clauses 
include the mandatory bid, the principle of equal trea ment of shareholders, the sell-out rule, and the 
break-through rule. The mandatory bid rule requires the acquirer to make a tender offer to all the 
shareholders once she has accumulated a certain percentage of the shares. The mandatory bid 
requirement is justified on the grounds that an investor who obtains control, may be tempted to 
exploit private benefits of control at the expense of the minority shareholders. As such, the role of 
the mandatory bid rule is to protect the minority shareholders by providing them with the 
opportunity to exit at a fair price. The principle of equal treatment complements the mandatory bid 
rule by requiring controlling shareholders, the management, and other constituencies to treat all 
shareholders within each individual class of shares equally. Although the principle of equal 
treatment constitutes an important principle of corporate governance regulation with respect to any 
type of corporate activities, it is particularly important in takeovers where the possibilities of 
violations of the rights of minority shareholders are far-reaching. The equal treatment principle 
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mandates an acquirer to offer minority shareholders to exit on terms that are no less favourable than 
those offered to the shareholders who sold a controlli g block. Both the mandatory bid rule and the 
equal treatment principle have received wide recognition at the regulatory level in European 
countries. The sell out and the break-through rules ar  less accepted at the regulatory level, though 
they also aim at protecting the minority shareholders (for an overview see Goergen et al., 2005).  
A minority claim is another legal device that grants shareholders the right to exit a company 
on fair terms when they fear their rights are expropriated. Some regulations stipulate a minimum 
(combined) percentage which enables shareholders to launch a minority claim. The lower the 
percentage of ownership required, the easier it is for hareholders to use the minority claim rights to 
challenge important managerial decisions.  
A fundamental element of corporate governance that provide minority shareholders with the 
entry right consists of the disclosure of voting and cash flow rights. Information about major share 
blocks allows the regulator, minority shareholders and the market to monitor large blockholders in 
order to avoid that the latter extracts private benefits of control at the expense of other stakeholders. 
In other words, transparency minimizes potential agency problems ex ante. Moreover, transparency 
allows the regulator to investigate, for instance, insider trading or self-dealing by large blockholders. 
The legal devices that provide minority shareholders with the right to entry and exit on fair 
terms are quantified into a minority shareholders affiliation rights index. A higher index score 
reflects that the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling blockholder is less likely 
(the components of this index and their coding is given in table 2).  
 
4.3 Regulatory provisions aimed at creditor rights protection  
 
Creditor protection hinges on the regulatory provisi n  that allow creditors to force 
repayment more easily, take possession of the collateral, or even gain control over firm. We closely 
follow the LLSV’s approach to assess the efficiency of national bankruptcy and reorganization laws 
in terms of protecting the interests of creditors from being dismissed by managers acting in the 
interests of shareholders. LLSV argue that creditors are less vulnerable to the opportunism and 
negligence of managers (shareholders) when the law enables them with the right to pull collateral 
from a firm without waiting for the completion of the reorganization procedure; when they are 
ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a 
bankrupt firm; and when they have the decision power to approve or veto the reorganisation 
(liquidation) procedure initiated by management (share olders). The protection of creditor rights 
also increases when the law requires the court or the creditors to appoint an independent official 
responsible for the operation of the business during the reorganization (or liquidation) procedure. 
We complement the LLSV set of regulatory provisions on creditor rights protection by 
emphasizing the difference between creditor-oriented and debtor-oriented insolvency codes. A 
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creditor-oriented code is a pure liquidation bankruptcy code according to which an insolvent 
company (or its creditors) has to initiate a liquidat on procedure and all of the company’s (bankrupt) 
property is claimed in the interest of the creditors. The key point of a pure liquidation bankruptcy 
code is that it does not provide for the possibility for a reorganization procedure, such that the 
insolvent company has to be declared bankrupt and its assets sold on behalf of the creditors. In 
contrast, a debtor-oriented code incorporates a reorganization option which may enable the company 
to continue its operations after restructuring. The purpose of the reorganization is to enable 
companies in financial distress but which still have prospects of continued profitable activity to 
restructure without resorting to bankruptcy. Asset r structuring usually also involves financial 
restructuring whereby creditors are writing down their claims. Examples of debtor-oriented codes 
are the Chapter 11 procedure in the US and Administration procedure in the UK. As insolvency 
codes that facilitate corporate reorganization focuses on corporate survival which leads to substantial 
write-downs of creditor claims, the (more senior) creditors may lose more in debtor-oriented codes 
than in creditor-oriented ones. Details about the calculation of the creditor rights index are given in 
Table 2; a higher index score signifies stronger crditor rights. 
 
5. Evolution of corporate governance regulations around the world 
 
5.1 Ownership structure around the world 
 
As discussed in section 2, the need to reform corporate governance regulation may be 
different in each country because of the differences in control structures. Therefore, in order to 
understand the evolution of the legal environments better, we exhibit in figures 1 and 2 the 
ownership and control concentration and structures in Europe and the US in the late 1990s. Since 
major corporate governance regulation reforms took place in the late 1990s, we predict how these 
ownership patterns may evolve as a result of the corporate governance reforms. 
Figures 1 and 2 show that the stakeholder-based regime prevails in most of Continental 
Europe and is characterized by majority or near-majority holdings of stock held in the hands of one 
shareholder or a small group of investors. In contrast, the shareholder-based system of the US, UK, 
and the Republic of Ireland, is characterized by a dispersed equity structure. Although the difference 
in ownership between Continental Europe, on the one hand, and the UK, US, and Ireland, on the 
other, is remarkable, there is still variation in the percentage of companies under majority or 
blocking minority control across the Continental European countries. In particular, Figure 1 shows 
that the countries of Scandinavian legal origin have the lowest percentage of companies that are 
controlled by a majority blockholder, whereas countries of German legal origin and the countries 
that recently acceded to the EU (with exception of for Slovenia) have the highest percentage. Figure 
2 reports that the percentage of Continental European companies controlled by investors controlling 
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a blocking minority of at least 25 percent is very high. The difference across countries is less 










































































































































































Figure 1. Percentage of listed companies Figure 2. Percentage of listed companies with a 
under majority control  blocking minority of at least 25%  
 
Data source: Faccio and Lang (2002) for European countries with law of English, German, French, and Scandinavian 
origin, Barca and Becht (2001) for the US, and the ECGI project “Corporate Governance & Disclosure in the Accession 
Process”(2001) for the EU accession countries. 
 
 
5.2 The protection of shareholder rights  
 
We develop two indices capturing the protection of shareholder rights: an ‘anti-directors’ 
right index employing the LLSV-methodology and a broader index. While the former captures a 
limited set of criteria, the broader shareholder rights index also measures the shareholders’ power to 
appoint directors, shareholder decision power, the board structure and the information available to 
shareholders (as discussed in section 4.1). 
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the updated and corrected ‘anti-directors’ right index of LLSV. 
We classify all countries into six groups according to their legal origin and economic development. 
Countries from the former communist block are classified according to their (staged) accession to 
the European Union, as this event has had an important impact on their legislative reforms prior to 
the accession. The dynamics of the index reveals tht most of European countries have reformed 
their corporate law during the 1990s in order to ensure better shareholder protection. The countries 
that were not involved in the reforms are those of English legal origin. However, these countries 
already had high standards of protection in place.  
It is important to note that although we apply the same methodology as LLSV to construct 
the index, we find that our index score differs for s me countries from the one reported by LLSV. 
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For instance, the difference is pronounced for the countries of English legal origin.9 An example of 
the differences between the LLSV index and our index is summarized in Appendix II where we 
compare the Delaware Code and UK Company law provisions.10  
Column 2 of Table 3 shows the dynamics in the protection of shareholder rights captured 
with our shareholder rights protection index and reveals that in virtually every European country 
significant changes in corporate law were implemented during the past 15 years. Nonetheless, 
countries of English legal origin remain the leaders in terms of the quality of shareholder protection. 
However, in the mean time, the French legal origin countries have evolved and reach a level close to 
the English origin standard. The lowest level of investor protection is nowadays observed in 
countries of German and Scandinavian legal origins, as well as in the EU 2004 accession countries. 
The countries achieving the strongest improvement in their legal environment over the period 
1990 to 2005 are the former communist-block countries that have recently joined the EU, whereas 
the least improvement is observed in Scandinavian cou tries (where shareholder protection has even 
decreased somewhat). The EU Accession process has already had an important impact on the 
legislative reforms in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. However, a discussed in section 2, one needs 
to put the shareholder protection index in the right perspective; an improvement in shareholder 
protection may not be meaningful if the enforcement of these rights in courts is difficult. This may 
be particularly difficult in Italy, and in Central nd Eastern Europe.  
Columns 3-6 of Table 3 dissect the shareholder protecti n index into an appointment rights 
sub-index, a decision rights sub-index, a trusteeship ub-index, and a transparency sub-index. For 
each of these constituting elements, there are striking differences across legal origins. Whereas the 
German origin countries and the EU 2004 Accession cuntries focus on reforms that provide 
shareholders with more decision rights in the firm (see Column 4 of Table 3), countries of English 
legal origin and those of likely 2007 EU accession direct their reforms to the establishment of a 
trusteeship relation to ensure a board of directors c ntinue representing the interest of shareholders 
after their election (see Column 5 of Table 3). A strategy that all countries deploy to improve 
shareholder protection is to provide investors with more transparency. Column 6 of Table 3 shows 
dramatic changes in transparency standards overall. Introducing (more strict) disclosure regulation is 
likely to affect the broader corporate governance system because it reduces the private benefits of 
control to major blockholders and also helps investors to monitor the management better and at 
lower costs. This may induce further convergence towards the shareholder-based corporate 
                                                
9 We find that, for some countries, the LLSV records of regulatory provisions do not coincide with those of our database. 
When we find inconsistencies we contacted our legal xperts again to clarify the issue. We replace LLSV records with 
new information only when our legal experts confirm that our information is correct.  
10 Most of corporate governance regulatory provisions in the US are on the state level rather than on federal level. 
Therefore, there is a considerable variation in legal regimes across the American states. In our analysis we only focus 
on Delaware where a majority of US companies is incorporated. 
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5.3 The protection of minority shareholder rights  
 
Fewer regulatory changes have taken place for the prot ction of minority shareholders since 
1990. Columns 1-5 of table 4 exhibit the changes in the minority shareholder rights protection index 
by legal origin and by country.  
The problem of the misalignment of interests between minority and majority shareholders 
has been addressed during the 1990s on a regulatory evel in almost all countries with the exception 
of the US, the Netherlands, and Spain (see column 1 of Table 4). Countries of French and German 
legal origin and former communist countries are the leaders among the reformers, whereas English 
and Scandinavian legal origin countries are much less involved in the reforms. Until about ten years 
ago, the highest level of minority protection was observed in the countries of English legal origin, 
but nowadays, the level of minority rights protection is relatively similar across all countries, with 
Scandinavian countries being lagging somewhat behind.  
We also dissect the minority shareholders protection index into three parts: appointment 
rights, decision rights, trusteeship strategies andffiliation strategies. As in the case of the 
shareholder rights protection index, countries are abl  to achieve an increase in minority shareholder 
protection using different strategies (see columns 2-5 of Table 4). The appointment rights, decision 
rights, and trusteeship strategies are mainly employed by the EU 2004 and EU 2007 (likely) 
accession countries and by only a few countries of French and Scandinavian legal origins (Italy, 
Finland, and Iceland). In these countries, the relative power of minority shareholders vis-à-vis a 
strong blockholder has been increased by stronger board representation, blocking minorities, 
minority claims, and voting caps.  
The affiliation strategy is pursued in virtually all countries to improve minority protection 
(see column 5 of Table 4). It is associated with granting minority shareholders the right to entry and 
exit the company on fair terms. The entry right is strengthened by the introduction of (more strict) 
disclosure requirements regarding corporate control s uctures and managerial activities. This should 
make investors aware of the firm’s governance structu e and potential agency problems before they 
decide to buy a firm’s shares. Reforms of takeover regulation, introduction of equal treatment of 
shareholders, mandatory bid, and sell-out rules in particular, enable minority shareholders to exit 
without being expropriated.  
An increase in the power of minority shareholders when a large blockholder is present in the 
firm reduces the private benefits of control of this blockholder which may lead to more ownership 
dispersion. Therefore, one could expected a shift towards more dispersed ownership in the leading 
reformers in the area of minority shareholder protection, namely: the French and German legal 
origin countries and the former communist countries. To conclude, also on this aspect of corporate 
governance we observe more convergence towards a shareholder-based system with lower 
ownership concentration. 
 
5.4 The protection of creditor rights  
 
Column 6 of Table 4 reports the evolution of the legal environment with respect to creditors 
rights protection. Strikingly, we find that countries have very different perspectives on the protection 
of creditor rights. There are three different scenarios: first, creditor protection in countries of French, 
German, and Scandinavian legal origin has weakened significantly. Second, former communist 
countries have in contrast moved towards more creditor protection. Finally, English legal origin 
countries have abstained from reforming their bankruptcy and reorganization legislation and have 
currently the system which is least protective for creditors.  
Most of the French, German, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have reorganized their 
bankruptcy legislation by introducing a reorganization procedure that enables companies to 
restructure their debts and escape liquidation. By the late 1990s, a large majority of Continental 
European countries (with exception of the former communist block) have a debtor-oriented 
corporate insolvency code that includes two tracks: a reorganization part (e.g. Administration in the 
UK) and a pure liquidation code (e.g. Receivership in the UK). It is in fact not that surprising that in 
a number of countries the creditor protection has diminished as in these countries one can observe an 
increase in shareholder protection. We believe that the lack of a well-developed equity market is one 
of the main reasons for the regulators of EU accession countries to increase creditor protection. 
Better protection of creditors reduces the costs of debt financing, which is essential for companies in 
such countries. Further equity market development in these countries may lead to a new wave of the 




This paper performs a comparative analysis of the corporate governance legal regimes and 
their evolution in 30 European countries and the US. The analysis is based on a unique corporate 
governance database that comprises the main changes in corporate governance regulations over the 
period 1990 to 2005. We develop three new corporate gov rnance indices that reflect the quality of 
national laws aimed at protecting (i) corporate share olders from being expropriated by 
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management, (ii) minority shareholders from being expropriated by large blockholder, and (iii) 
creditors from being expropriated by shareholders. We further dissect these indices along various 
dimensions of regulator strategies (as captured by e.g. the subindices expressing relative decision 
power, appointment rights, trusteeship, or corporate transparency). We find that, in contrast to the 
LLSV ranking system, our new governance indices capture a broader scope of corporate governance 
regulation reforms and their dynamics. 
The time-series analysis of the newly constructed indices reveals that virtually every country 
from our sample has been involved in substantial chnges in their corporate legislations since 1990. 
The changes relate to all three major types of agency problems. The improvement of corporate 
transparency has been a dominant legal strategy across ountries to address both the protection of 
shareholders from the misuse of corporate assets by managers, and the protection of minority 
shareholders from expropriation by a strong blockholder. A large majority of continental European 
countries also has also strengthened the protection of minority shareholders in their takeover 
regulations.  
We also detect some differences in the patterns of legal reforms across countries. For 
instance, in their attempts to improve shareholder protection, German legal origin and EU 2004 
accession countries focus on reforms that provide shareholders with more decision rights in the firm, 
while the countries of English legal origin (and those of the EU 2007 accession) direct their reforms 
to the representation of investors on the board of irectors (trusteeship) and the effective monitoring 
by boards. Furthermore, countries have very different p rspectives on the how to deal with financial 
distress and bankruptcy. Whereas French, German, and Scandinavian legal origin countries put less 
emphasis on creditor protection, the former communist countries move in the opposite direction and 
strengthen creditor protection. Countries of English egal origin have not modified their bankruptcy 
and reorganization codes.  
While varying degrees of creditor protection that were recently introduced in national 
bankruptcy laws show that the global convergence of legal systems towards a single system of 
corporate regulation is unlikely, there are still sign  of increasing convergence by national corporate 
governance regulations towards a shareholder-based regime when the protection of (minority) 
shareholders is considered. The recent legislative changes in countries of French and German legal 
origin may bring about more ownership dispersion in time. A stakeholder-based system is likely to 
be maintained in Scandinavian and former communist countries. Over the past 15 years, 
Scandinavian countries have substantially lagged other West-European countries in terms of 
increasing the level of (minority) shareholder rights protection, such that their legal reforms may be 
insufficient to induce changes in corporate control. In contrast to Scandinavian countries, the former 
communist countries have undertaken dramatic revisions of their national corporate legislation in 
order to guarantee (theoretically) more (minority) shareholder protection. However, the ownership 
structure is unlikely to evolve towards more disperion because their reforms also augment the 
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creditor rights in case of financial distress. This regulatory choice may discourage the development 
of efficient equity markets and hence changes in corporate control.  
The countries of English legal origin still provide the highest quality of shareholder 
protection. In the mean time, many Continental European countries have improved their legal system 
up to the standard set by the English legal system. Whether and to what extent these reforms will 
lead to changes in the degree of ownership and control concentration remains an appealing topic for 
future research.  
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The names of the legal experts who contributed to our c rporate governance database are presented 
below:  
 
Austria: Prof. Dr. Susanne Kalls (University of Klagenfurt), Prof. Dr. Christian Nowotny and Mr. Stefan Fida (Vienna 
University of Economics and Business Administration); 
Belgium: Prof. Dr. Eddy Wymeersch (University of Ghent, Chairman of the Commission for Finance, Banking and 
Assurance), Prof. Dr. Christoph Van der Elst (University of Ghent); 
Bulgaria: Dr. Plamen Tchipev (Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), Ms. Tania Bouzeva (ALIENA 
Consult Ltd., Sofia), Dr. Ivaylo Nikolov (Centre for Economic Development, Sofia); 
Croatia: Dr. Domagoj Racic and Mr. Josip Stajfer (The Institute of Economics, Zagreb), Mr. Andrej Galogaža (Zagreb 
Stock Exchange), Prof. Dr. Drago Čengić (IVO PILAR Institute of Social Sciences), Prof. Dr. Edita Culinovic-
Herc (University of Rijeka); 
Cyprus: Mr. Marios Clerides (Chairman) and Ms. Christiana Vovidou (Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission); 
Czech Republic: Prof. Dr. Lubos Tichy, Mr. Martin Abraham, and Mr. Rostislav Pekar (Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, 
Cousellors at Law), Dr. Petr Kotáb and Prof. Dr. Milan Bakes (Charles University of Prague), Dr. Stanislav 
Myslil (Čermák Hořejš Myslil a spol, Lawyers and Patent Attorneys), Dr. Jan Bárta (Institute of State and Law, 
The Academy of Science of Czech Republic), Ms. Jana Klirova  (Corporate Governance Consulting, Prague); 
Denmark: Prof. Dr. Jesper Lau Hansen and Prof. Dr. Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen (University of Copenhagen);  
Estonia: Prof. Dr. Andres Vutt  (University of Tartu), Mr. Toomas Luhaaar, Mr. Peeter Lepik, and Ms Katri Paas 
(Law Office of Lepik & Luhaäär); 
Finland: Prof. Dr. Matti J. Sillanpää (Turku School of Economics and Business Administration), Mr. Ingalill Aspholm  
(Rahoitustarkastus/Financial Supervision Authority), Ms Ari-Pekka Saanio  (Borenius & Kemppinen, Attorneys at 
Law, Helsinki), Ms Johan Aalto (Hannes Snellman, Attorneys at Law; Helsinki); 
France: Prof. Dr. Alain Couret  (Université Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne), Ms. Joëlle Simon (MEDEF - French Business 
Confederation), Prof. Dr. Benoit Le Bars (MC Université de Cergy-Pontoise), Prof. Dr. Alain Pietrancosta 
(Universities of Tours and Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne), Prof. Dr. Viviane de Beaufort (ESSEC-MBA), Prof. Dr. 
Gerard Charreaux (Université de Bourgogne Pôle d'économie et de gestion); 
Germany: Prof. Dr. Peter O. Muelbert (University of Mainz), Prof. Dr. Klaus Hopt and Dr. Alexander Hellgardt (Max 
Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law),  Prof. Dr. Theodor Baums and Mr. Tobias 
Pohl (Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main); 
Greece: Prof. Dr. Loukas Spanos (Centre of Financial Studies, University of Athens), Dr. Harilaos Mertzanis (Hellenic 
Capital Market Commission), Prof. Dr. Georgios D. Sotiropoulos (University of Athens); 
Hungary: Dr.Tamás Sándor (Sándor Bihary Szegedi Szent-Ivány Advocats), Dr. Andras Szecskay and Dr. Orsolya 
Görgényi (Szecskay Law Firm - Moquet Borde & Associés), Prof. Dr. Adam Boóc and Prof. Dr. Anna Halustyik 
(Corvinus University of Budapest); 
Iceland: Mr. Gunnar Sturluson and Mr. Olafur Arinbjorn Sigurdsson (LOGOS legal services), Dr. Aðalsteinn E. 
Jónasson  (Straumur Investment Bank and Reykjavik University), Mr. David Sch. Thorssteinsson (Iceland 
Chamber of Commerce); 
Ireland Republic: Dr. Blanaid Clarke (University College Dublin), Ms. Kelley Smith (Irish Law Library, Barrister); 
Italy: Prof. Dr. Guido Ferrarini and Mr. Andrea Zanoni (University of Genoa), Dr. Magda Bianco and Dr. Alessio 
Pacces (Banca d'Italia), Prof. Dr. Luca Enriques (Università di Bologna); 
Latvia: Prof. Dr. Kalvis Torgans and Dr. Pauls Karnups (University of Latvia), Mr. Uldis Cerps (Riga Stock Exchange); 
Lithuania: Mr. Virgilijus Poderys (Chairman) and Ms. Egle Surpliene (The Securities Commission of Lithuania), Mr. 
Rolandas Valiūnas, Dr. Jaunius Gumbis, and Dr. Dovil÷ Burgien÷ (Lideika, Petrauskas, Valiūnas ir partneriai), 
Dr. Paulius Cerka (Vytautas Magnus University), Mr. Tomas Bagdanskis (Tomas Bagdanskis, Attorney at Law); 
Luxembourg: Mr. Jacques Loesch (Linklaters Loesch Law Firm), Mr. Daniel Dax (Luxembourg Stock Exchange); 
Netherlands: Prof. Dr. Jaap Winter (De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, High Level Group of C mpany Law Experts 
European Commission Office (Chairman), University of Amsterdam), Mr. Marcel van de Vorst and Mr. Gijs van 
Leeuwen (Norton Rose Advocaten & Solicitors), Mr. Johan Kleyn and Dr. Barbara Bier (Allen & Overy LLP), Dr. 
Pieter Ariens Kappers (Boekel De Nerée), Prof. Dr. A.F. Verdam (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Prof. Mr. C. A. 
Schwarz (Maastricht University); 
Norway: Prof. Dr. Kristin Normann Aarum (Oslo University), Prof. Dr. Tore Brathen (University of Tromsø), Prof. Dr. 
Jan Andersson (University of Bergen); 
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Poland: Prof. Stanisław Sołtysiński and Dr. Andrzej W. Kawecki (The law firm of Sołtysiński Kawecki & Szlęzak), Mr. 
Igor Bakowski (Gotshal & Manges, Chajec, Don-Siemion & śyto Sp.k.), Dr. Piotr Tamowicz, Mr. Maciej 
DzierŜanowski, and Mr. Michał Przybyłowski (The Gdańsk Institute for Market Economics), Ms. Anna Miernika-
Szulc  (Warsaw Stock Exchange); 
Portugal: Mr. Victor Mendes (CMVM – Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários), Mr. Carlos Ferreira Alves 
(CEMPRE, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto), Prof. Dr. Manuel Pereira Barrocas (Barrocas 
Sarmento Rocha - Sociedade de Advogados), Dr. Jorge de Brito Pereira (PLMJ - A.M. Pereira, Sragga Leal, 
Oliveira Martins, J dice e Associados - Sociedade de A vogados), Dr. Manuel Costa Salema, Dr. Carlos Aguiar, 
and Mr. Pedro Pinto (Law firm Carlos Aguiar P Pinto & Associados), Mr. Antonio Alfaia de Carvalho (Lebre Sá 
Carvalho & Associados); 
Romania: Mr. Gelu Goran  (Salans, Bucharest office), Dr. Sorin David (Law firm David & Baias SCPA), Ms. Adriana I. 
Gaspar (Nestor Nestor Diculescu Kingston Petersen, Attorneys & Counselors), Mr. Catalin Baiculescu and Dr. 
Horatiu Dumitru (Musat & Associates, Attorneys at Law), Ms. Catalina Grigorescu (Haarmann Hemmelrath Law 
Firm); 
Slovak Republic: Dr. Jozef Makuch (Chairman) and Dr. Stanislav Škurla (Financial Market Authority, Slovak 
Republic), Dr. Frantisek Okruhlica (Slovak Governance Institute); 
Slovenia: Prof. Dr. Janez Prasnikar and Dr. Aleksandra Gregoric (University of Ljubljana), Prof. Dr. Miha Juhart, Mr. 
Klemen Podobnik, and Ms. Ana Vlahek (Securities Market Agency); 
Spain: Prof. Dr. Candido Paz-Ares (Universidad Autonoma de Madrid), Prof. Dr. Marisa Aparicio (Universidad 
Autonoma de Madrid and Universidad Pontificia Comillas de Madrid), Prof. Dr. Guillermo Guerra (Universidad 
Rey Juan Carlos); 
Sweden: Prof. Dr. Per Samuelsson and Prof. Dr. Gerard Muller (School of Economics and Management at Lund 
University), Prof. Dr. Rolf Dotevall (Göteborg University), Dr. Catarina af Sandeberg, and Prof. Dr. Annina 
Persson (Stockholm University), Prof. Dr. Björn Kristiansson (Linklaters Sweden); 
Switzerland: Dr. Urs P. Gnos (Walder Wyss & Partners), Prof. Dr. Gerard Hertig (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
- ETH Zurich), Dr. Michel Haymann (Haymann & Baldi), Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Drobetz (University of Basel – 
WWZ), Prof. Dr. Karl Hofstetter (Universität Zürich), Prof. Dr. Peter Nobel and Mr. Marcel Würmli (Universität 
St. Gallen); 
UK: Prof. Dr. Antony Dnes (Bournemouth University), Prof. Dr. Dan Prentice and Ms. Jenny Payne (Oxford University), 
Prof. Dr. Brian R Cheffins, Mr. Richard Charles Nolan, and Mr. John Armour (University of Cambridge), Prof. 
Dr. Paul Davies (London School of Economics), Mr. Gerard N. Cranley, Ms. Holly Gregory, and Ms. Ira Millstein 
(Weil, Gotshal & Manges), Ms. Eva Lomnicka (University of London); 
US: Prof.  Mark Roe (University of Harvard), Prof. Dr. Edward Rock (University of Pennsylvania Law School), Prof. Dr. 




Appendix II.  
 
The table summarizes the provision of the Delaware and UK Company Law with regard to the shareholder rights 
employed to construct the LLSV anti-director index. The classification of shareholder rights closely follows the one 
deployed in LLSV. If a particular provision is in the law, we denote this with 1; it is 0 otherwise.   
 
Shareholder rights UK 
LLSV data 
UK Company Law US 
LLSV data 
Delaware Code 
One-share-one-vote 0 0 
(The law does not forbid non-
voting shares) 
0 0  
(Non-voting shares are allowed subject 
to inclusion in the certificate of 
incorporation, Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8 
§151(a)) 
Proxy by mail 
allowed 
1 1 
(The law requires this) 
1 1 
(The Code also permits the use of 
electronic or telegraphic proxies. 
Telephonic proxies or internet website 
proxies are used as well, Del. Code. 
Ann. tit. 8 § 212(c)(2)) 
Shares are not 
blocked before a 
general meeting 
1 1 
(A deposit is not wholly forbidden 
but the practice is not present) 
1 1 
(No provisions in the Code  
but the practice is not present) 




(There are no requirements by law 
and the practice is not present) 
1 0  
(Cumulative voting is optional, subject 
to inclusion in the certificate of 
incorporation, Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8 
§214) 
Oppressed minority 1 0 
(No provisions in the Law and the 
practice is not present) 
1 1 
(Any shareholder can bring a fiduciary 
duty claim against a management 
decision that is a breach/conflict of 
interest favoring majority shareholders) 
Preemptive right to 
new issues 
1 1 
(The law grants preemptive rights 
in relation to the issue of equity 
shares for cash) 
0 0 
(Prior to 1967, Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8 
provided for stockholders preemptive 
rights, unless limited by the certificate of 




4 3 4 3 
     
Percentage of share 
capital to call an 
extraordinary 
meeting 
.10 .10 .10 Majority  
(In Delaware shareholders may not call a 
special shareholders meeting, unless 
otherwise provided in the certificate of 
incorporation or bylaws, see Del. Code. 
Ann. tit. 8 §211(d). The Code lets a 
majority of shares act without a meeting, 




Table 2. Methodology employed to construct corporate governance regulation indices 
 
The table shows how specific regulations are quantified to construct three corporate governance regulation indices: the 
shareholder rights protection index, the minority shareholders protection index, and the creditor rights protection. Some 
regulatory aspects are incorporated in several indices. 
 
 
1. The shareholder rights protection index (Max=32) reflects the shareholders’ ability to mitigate managerial opportunistic 
behavior. The index is constructed by combining the following 4 sub-indices: 
 
1.1 The appointment rights index (Max=12) is based on the rules to appoint and replace executiv  and non-executive directors. It 
measures the degree of alignment of the interests of management and shareholders. The regulatory provisions are quantified as 
follows: 
 Employee representation: 0 if required, 2 if not.  
 Nomination to the board by shareholders: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
 Tenure on the board: 0 if more than 4 years, 1 if 4 years, 2 if less then 4 years  
 Cross-shareholdings:  
o Cross-shareholdings between 2 independent companies: 1 if regulated, 0 if not. 
o Maximum shareholding of a subsidiary in its parent company: 1 if regulated, 0 if not 
 Election rules:  
o Proxy voting by mail: 2 if allowed, 0 if not 
o Requirement to Deposit/Register shares prior to a general meeting: 
 Bearer shares: 0 if deposit is required, 1 if only registration of shares is required, 2 if none is required 
 Nominal shares: 0 if deposit is required, 2 if deposit requirement is forbidden 
 
1.2 The decision rights index (Max=8) captures the shareholders’ ability to mitigate manageri l discretion. The decision rights 
index cover regulatory provisions that mandate direct shareholder decision-making. The regulatory provisi ns are quantified as 
follows: 
 Shareholders approval of anti-takeover defense measur s: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
 Shareholders approval of preemption rights: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
 Percentage needed to call for extraordinary meeting: 0 if no rule or more than 20%, 1 if 20% or less but more than 5%, 2 if 
5% and less. 
 Voting caps: 0 if allowed, 2 if not. 
 
1.3 The trusteeship index (Max=5) measures the efficiency of the board of directors in monitoring the actions of CEOs. The 
following regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Board independence:  
o 2 if CEO cannot be the chairman of the board of directors (in 1-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
o 2 if the overlap between management and supervisory board is forbidden (in 2-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
 Employee representation: 0 if required, 2 if not.  
 Separate board of auditors: 1 if required, 0 otherwise 
 
1.4 The transparency index (Max=7) is based on the quality of information about company, its ownership structure, and 
management available to investors 
 Requirement to disclose managerial compensation: 0 if not required, 1 if required on aggregate basis, 2 if required on 
individual basis. 
 Requirement to disclose any transactions between management and company: 2 if required, 0 if not 
 Frequency of financial reports: 0 if once per year, 1 if twice per year, 2 if more than twice per year 
 Comply or explain rule: 1 if the requirement is present, 0 otherwise 
 
The higher each index, the better is the protection of the shareholders. 
 
2. The minority shareholders protection index (Max= 27) is based on the regulatory provisions aimed at increasing the relative 
power of the minority shareholders in a context of strong majority shareholders. The index is constructed by combining the 
following 4 sub-indices: 
 
4.1 Minority shareholders appointment rights index (Max=5) is based on the appointment rights that can be used to protect 
minority shareholders. These include rights to reserve seats on the board of directors for minority share olders or to limit voting 
power of large shareholders. The regulatory provisin  are quantified as follows: 
 Minority representation on the board: 2 if required, 0 otherwise.  
 Voting caps limiting power of large shareholders: 1 if voting caps are allowed, 0 if not. 
 One-share-one-vote rule: 0 if both multiple voting rights and non-voting shares are allowed; 1 if one f the two is allowed; 2 
if none is allowed. 
 
4.2 Minority shareholders decision rights index (Max=4) captures the ability of minority shareholders to affect fundamental 
corporate transactions that require a shareholder vot . The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Supermajority requirement for approval of major company’s decisions: 0 if 50% or less; 1 if more then 50% but less then 
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75%; 2 if 75% or more 
 Percentage needed to call for extraordinary meeting: 0 if the rule is not present or required percentage is 20% or more; 1 if 
the required percentage is between 20 and 5%; 2 if the percentage is 5% or less. 
 
4.3 The minority shareholders trusteeship rights index (Max=4) indicates the extent to which the board of directors serves as a 
trustee for minority shareholder, i.e. the directors are independent from the firm’s controlling shareolders. The regulatory 
provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Nomination to the board by shareholders: 2 if shareolders voting to elect non-executive directors is not required (2-tier 
boards); 0 if required or 1-tier board 
 Board independence: 2 if CEO cannot be the chairman of the board of directors (in 1-tier board structure) or if the 
overlap between management and supervisory board is forbidden (in 2-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
 
4.4 The minority shareholders affiliation rights index (Max=14) groups the remaining regulatory provisions aimed at protecting 
minority shareholders: the principle of equal treatment (or shared returns) and rights for entry and exit on fair terms. The 
regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Equal treatment rule: 2 if required, 0 if not, 
 Mandatory disclosure of large ownership stakes: 0 if disclosure is not required or the minimum percent is 25% or more; 1 if 
10% or more (less then 25%); 2 if 5% or more (less then 10%); 3 if less then 5%. 
 Mandatory bid rule: 0 if not required; 1 if 50% or control; 2 if between 50 and 30%; 3 if 30% or less. 
 Sell-out rule: The squeeze-out rule is used as a proxy for the sell-out rule, (assumption: sell-out is always in place if squeeze-
out is adopted, with the same terms as squeeze-out): 0 if no squeeze-out; 1 if squeeze-out at 95% or mre; 2 if squeeze-out at 
90% or less. 
 Minority claim: 0 if no; 1 if 10% or more; 2 if 5% or more; 3 if less then 5%. 
 Break-through rule: 1 if required; 0 if not, 
 
The higher each index, the better is the protection of the minority shareholders. 
 
3. The creditor rights protection index (Max=5) is based on regulatory provisions that allow creditors to force repayment more 
easily, take possession of collateral, or gain control over firm in financial distress. The regulatory provisions are quantified as 
follows: 
 
 Debtor-oriented versus Creditor-oriented code: 1 if no reorganization option (liquidation only); 0 if reorganization + 
liquidation option; 
 Automatic stay on the assets: 1 if no automatic stay is obliged in reorganization (if debt-orient code) or liquidation 
procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise; 
 Secured creditors are ranked first: 1 if secured critors are ranked first in the liquidation procedure; 0 if government and 
employees are ranked first; 
 Creditor approval of bankruptcy: 1 if creditor approval is required to initiate reorganization procedure (if debtor-oriented 
code) or liquidation procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise; 
 Appointment of official to manage reorganization/liquidation procedure: 1 if it is required by law in a reorganization 
procedure (if debtor-oriented code) or a liquidation procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise. 
 








SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION INDEX: 
 Total Index Appointment Rights 
strategy 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 
 
English Legal Origin: 
Ireland     3 3 3 3 16 16 18 21 8 8 8 8 3 3 5 5 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 5 
UK          3 3 3 3 19 22 24 24 9 9 9 9 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 3 4 6 6 
US (Delaware) 3 3 3 3 15 15 15 17 6 6 6 6 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 6 6 6 7 
Average  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 16.7 17.7 19.0 20.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 3.0 3.0 3.7 3.7 2.0 2.7 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.3 5.0 6.0 
                         
French Legal Origin: 
Belgium     2 2 2 2 15 17 18 18 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 4 5 5 
France      2 2 2 4 11 11 11 16 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 6 
Greece      3 3 3 3 12 12 15 20 4 4 4 4 5 5 7 7 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 6 
Italy       1 1 3 4 15 15 22 26 8 8 9 9 2 2 5 7 3 3 3 3 2 2 5 7 
Luxembourg  0 0 0 0 11 11 11 12 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 5 
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 15 15 15 19 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 6 
Portugal    2 2 3 3 15 15 17 20 6 6 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 7 
Spain       3 3 3 4 15 15 15 19 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 6 
Average 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.6 13.6 13.9 15.5 18.8 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.5 4.1 4.1 4.8 5.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 3.4 6.0 
                         
German Legal Origin: 
Austria     3 3 4 4 9 10 14 14 2 2 4 4 3 3 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Germany     2 2 3 3 12 14 16 18 3 3 3 3 3 5 7 7 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 6 
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 10 10 13 17 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 5 
Average 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 10.3 11.3 14.3 16.3 3.3 3.3 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.7 5.7 5.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.7 4.7 
                         
Scandinavian Legal Origin: 
Denmark     2 2 2 2 9 9 9 11 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 
Finland     1 1 2 2 15 15 17 19 6 6 7 7 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 7 
Iceland     2 2 2 2 20 18 18 22 8 8 8 8 5 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 7 





SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION INDEX: 
 Total Index Appointment Rights 
strategy 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Sweden      2 2 2 2 9 12 12 12 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 0 3 3 3 
Average 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 13.4 13.6 14.4 16.0 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.4 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 3.0 3.6 5.2 
                         
EU Accession 2004: 
Cyprus      4 4 4 4 14 15 15 18 9 9 9 9 3 3 3 5 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 2 
Czech Rep 0 1 1 3 5 7 10 13 2 2 3 3 1 1 3 6 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 
Estonia     0 1 1 2 9 15 17 19 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 0 1 3 5 
Hungary     0 0 1 2 6 6 10 15 3 3 3 5 1 1 3 5 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 3 
Latvia      0 1 1 2 13 15 15 17 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 0 2 2 4 
Lithuania   2 3 3 3 9 18 20 24 4 6 6 7 3 5 5 7 2 4 4 4 0 3 5 6 
Poland      2 2 2 2 13 18 14 15 6 6 4 2 3 3 3 5 4 4 2 2 0 5 5 6 
Slovak Rep  0 1 1 2 8 8 8 10 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 5 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Slovenia    1 3 3 4 8 9 11 16 3 4 4 4 3 3 5 7 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 3 
Average 1.0 1.8 1.9 2.7 9.4 12.3 13.3 16.3 4.3 4.8 4.7 4.8 2.6 3.0 3.7 5.3 2.4 2.9 2.7 2.7 0.1 1.7 2.3 3.6 
                         
EU (likely) Accession 2007: 
Bulgaria    0 0 2 3 11 12 14 18 4 4 4 4 5 5 7 7 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 5 
Croatia     1 2 2 4 12 14 14 23 6 5 5 6 2 5 5 7 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 6 
Romania     0 0 1 2 11 11 14 19 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 5 3 3 5 5 0 0 1 4 
Average 0.3 0.7 1.7 3.0 11.3 12.3 14.0 20.0 5.0 4.7 4.7 5.0 3.3 4.3 5.0 6.3 3.0 3.0 3.7 3.7 0.0 0.3 0.7 5.0 





Table 4. Newly constructed minority shareholder rights and creditor rights protection indices by country and over time 
 
 MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION INDEX: CREDITOR RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 
INDEX  
Total Index Appointment Rights 
strategy 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 
                         
English Legal Origin: 
Ireland     13 13 16 16 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 9 9 12 12 2 2 2 2 
UK          14 16 16 16 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 2 2 2 8 8 8 8 2 2 2 2 
US (Delaware) 8 8 8 8 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 
Average  11.7 12.3 13.3 13.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 7.3 7.3 8.3 8.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
                         
French Legal Origin: 
Belgium     12 13 13 13 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 8 9 9 9 5 5 2 2 
France      12 12 12 14 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 11 1 1 1 1 
Greece      7 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 4 5 6 4 4 4 4 
Italy       7 11 18 17 2 2 4 3 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 8 12 12 2 2 2 1 
Luxembourg  3 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Netherlands 13 13 13 13 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 
Portugal    6 6 11 13 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 8 4 4 4 3 
Spain       15 15 15 15 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 1 1 1 1 
Average 9.4 10.1 11.8 12.3 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 5.4 6.1 7.4 8.0 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.3 
                         
German Legal Origin: 
Austria     15 15 17 17 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 6 6 8 8 2 2 2 2 
Germany     9 11 12 16 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 5 6 10 3 3 2 2 
Switzerland 5 7 11 10 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 4 8 7 5 5 3 3 
Average 9.7 11.0 13.3 14.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 3.7 5.0 7.3 8.3 3.3 3.3 2.3 2.3 
                         
Scandinavian Legal Origin: 
Denmark     10 10 12 12 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 6 6 8 8 3 3 3 3 
Finland     9 10 10 10 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 5 5 5 2 2 2 
Iceland     7 8 11 12 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 6 7 2 2 2 2 
Norway      11 11 11 12 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 6 6 7 3 3 3 3 
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 MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION INDEX: CREDITOR RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 
INDEX  
Total Index Appointment Rights 
strategy 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Sweden      9 10 10 10 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 
Average 9.2 9.8 10.8 11.2 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 4.2 4.6 5.8 6.2 3.4 2.8 2.2 2.2 
                         
EU Accession 2004: 
Cyprus      5 5 7 9 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 
Czech Rep   6 10 12 20 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 0 4 6 10 0 4 4 4 
Estonia     2 7 9 12 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 2 4 7 0 2 2 3 
Hungary     8 8 14 16 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 7 9 0 2 2 3 
Latvia      8 9 9 14 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 8 0 5 5 5 
Lithuania   11 11 12 13 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 6 7 8 0 5 5 3 
Poland      12 17 15 18 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 8 6 9 2 2 2 3 
Slovak Rep  6 12 12 15 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 6 6 9 2 2 2 2 
Slovenia    7 12 18 17 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 6 12 12 0 1 1 1 
Average 7.2 10.1 12.0 14.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.7 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.4 4.1 6.0 8.6 1.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 
                         
EU (likely) Accession 2007: 
Bulgaria    3 7 11 11 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 5 8 8 0 2 2 2 
Croatia     7 10 14 15 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 7 9 5 5 4 4 
Romania     4 9 12 14 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 5 6 6 1 2 2 3 
Average 4.7 8.7 12.3 13.3 1.0 1.0 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 0.7 0.7 1.3 1.3 1.0 4.7 7.0 7.7 2.0 3.0 2.7 3.0 
                         
 
